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Abstract 
Purpose 
Until now, there has been scant evidence on the proportion and characteristics of 
employees working without a written contract or terms of employment. To begin to 
fill this gap, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the prevalence and distribution of 
employees without written contracts or terms of employment in the European Union 
(EU), examining whether they are unevenly distributed across countries and EU 
regions, and whether it is vulnerable population groups who are more likely to be 
without such written contracts.  
 
Methodology 
To do this, a 2013 Eurobarometer survey comprising 11,025 face-to-face interviews 
with employees in the 28 member states of the European Union (EU-28) is reported. 
 
Findings 
The finding is that it is less socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, 
and more firm size, institutional environment and spatial factors that are important in 
explaining the prevalence of employment without a written contract. Thus, 
governments should address not individuals but rather, the formal institutional failings 
and asymmetry between civic and state morality, in order to reduce the level of 
employment without a written contract, and focus their attention on smaller firms, 
larger towns and Southern European countries, especially Cyprus, Malta and Portugal.  
 
Research limitations 
Future research needs to evaluate whether and how the conditions of employment 
(e.g., wage rates, health and safety conditions, holiday entitlements) of employees 
without written contracts or terms of employment differ to their equivalents who have 
written contracts or terms of employment. This will reveal the implications of workers 
not being issued with written contracts or terms of employment.   
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Originality/value 
This is one of the first extensive evaluations of the prevalence and distribution of 
employees without written contracts or terms of employment.  
 
Keywords: undeclared work; informal economy; employee relations; European 
Union 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the prevalence and distribution of employees 
without written formal contracts or terms of employment. This is an issue that lies at 
the very heart of the study of employee relations. Although such a practice is not 
everywhere an illegal practice, it is widely believed that those without written 
contracts or terms of employment suffer poorer quality working conditions, that such 
a practice weakens collective bargaining and puts pressure on legitimate businesses to 
also adopt such a practice due to the unfair competition facing them (Andrews et al. 
2011; ILO 2015; Williams, 2014). Based on this assumption, not only has the 
European Commission has since 1991 had a directive calling for all member states to 
adopt written contracts or terms of employment as a good practice, but legislative 
initiatives have been pursued in many countries to make it illegal not to offer written 
contracts or terms of employment to employees. Until now, however, little is known 
about the prevalence or distribution of employees without written contracts or terms 
of employment. This paper seeks to begin to fill that gap.  
Here, therefore, we advance understanding of those without written contracts 
or terms of employment in three ways. From an empirical viewpoint, we report 
Eurobarometer survey data from 28 member states to reveal the prevalence and 
distribution of this practice, an issue which until now has been subject to very little 
empirical evaluation. Secondly, and theoretically, we evaluate whether its prevalence 
and distribution reflects the long-standing marginality thesis which views such 
informal practices as concentrated among marginalized and vulnerable populations. 
And finally, and from a policy perspective, we show how it is not individuals who 
should be targeted but rather, the formal institutional failings and asymmetry between 
civic and state morality, in order to reduce the level of employment without a written 
contract, especially in South European countries.   
To commence, therefore, the next section provides a brief review of the 
previous literature, highlighting the legal position regarding this type of employment, 
followed by a review of the various alternative competing explanations for this 
practice and what the limited evidence currently available suggests about its 
prevalence and distribution. To test the resultant hypotheses, the third section then 
introduces the data used, namely a 2013 Eurobarometer survey comprising 11,025 
face-to-face interviews with employees in the 28 member states of the European 
Union (EU-28), and the analytical methods employed; a staged logistic regression 
model controlling both for the country- and regional-level fixed effects. The fourth 
section reports the findings regarding its prevalence and distribution across the 
European Union, followed in the fifth and final section by a discussion of the 
implications for theory and policy, along with the limitations of the results and future 
research required.   
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Employment without a written contract or terms of employment: literature 
review and hypotheses  
 
For a quarter of century across the 28 member states of the European Union (EU28), 
the Employment Information Directive 1991 (91/553/EEC) has stated that every 
employee (however defined by member state law) has the right to a written statement 
of the terms and conditions of their employmHQW 5HIHUUHG WR DV µVWDWHPHQWV RI
HPSOR\PHQW SDUWLFXODUV¶ HPSOR\HUV are directed to give all employees a written 
agreement that article 2 of this 1991 directive states must include: the identity of the 
SDUWLHVSODFHRIZRUNRUHPSOR\HU¶VGRPLFLOHWLWOH, grade, category or nature of work, 
or a brief description of the work; commencement date; for temporary contracts, 
expected duration; paid leave; periods of notice or method for determining; initial 
pay; working time, and where appropriate, the collective agreement or joint 
representation institutions. This information, as article 3 states, has to be in writing 
and cannot be changed without the agreement of the employee. The only exceptions, 
as article 1 states, are that this does not need to be applied to those working less than 
RQHPRQWKRUZLWK DZRUNLQJZHHNRI OHVV WKDQHLJKWKRXUVRU WR MREVRID µFDVXDO
DQGRUVSHFLILFQDWXUH¶LIWKLVLVMXVWLILHGE\REMHFWLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV 
Nevertheless, although this directive suggests to member states what should 
occur, legislation varies across member states in terms of whether there is a legal 
requirement to provide employees with a written contract or terms of employment 
(see EURES, 2016). A written employment contract is always required in all East-
Central European member states (i.e., Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) except Hungary and Poland, in 
Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden but not Finland), as well as in Italy and 
Greece. In all these member states, the contract must be signed in advance or 
immediately after starting work.  
In all other EU member states, although a written contract is not required, the 
employee must be given written terms of employment and the mandatory content of 
the terms of employment is specified by law. In West European member states 
therefore, as well as in Hungary, Poland, and Portugal, a written contract is 
considered good practice but is legally required either only for µatypical¶ employment 
(e.g., an apprenticeship, fixed-term, seasonal, or part-time jobs), as is the case in 
Austria, Belgium, France and Portugal, or, the other way around, only for contracts of 
indefinite duration (Cyprus and Hungary), or is not generally required (Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland and the UK). Instead, they require only the 
provision of written terms of employment, which for most employees is widely seen 
as good as, and indistinguishable from, a written contract.   
 To understand employers not issuing written contracts or terms of 
employment, therefore, it is important to recognise that although this is not legally 
required in some countries for some types of employment (as detailed above), this is 
not the only instance in which written contracts of terms of employment are not 
provided. There are also employers who violate the labour laws of their member state 
and do not issue a written contract even when it is required by national law, and do so 
in order to evade paying the tax and social contributions owed by them when they 
formally employ an employee. In the first instance, although it contravenes good 
practice, it is legal, whilst in the second case it not only contravenes good practice but 
also labour law and is thus illegal.   
Until now, however, little is known about such a form of employment. Not 
only are there few studies of the prevalence and distribution of employees without a 
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written contract or terms of employment (with the exception of Hazans, 2011), but 
neither has there been any attempt to explain or theorise its prevalence and 
distribution. To do so, therefore, theories used to explain the broader undeclared 
economy can be used (Williams, 2014, 2015; Williams and Horodnic, 2016). When 
theorizing the undeclared economy, a marginalization thesis dominates, which argues 
that the undeclared economy is concentrated among populations marginalized from 
the formal labour market and social protection. Firstly, modernization theory views 
such a form of employment as a residue from a previous mode of production that 
persists in peripheral populations that have not yet modernized, such as uneducated 
people serving µERWWRP RI WKH S\UDPLG¶ PDUNHWV /D 3RUWD DQG 6FKOHLIHU . 
Secondly, political economy theorists see such work as an inherent component of a 
deregulated global economy in which employers are seeking to reduce labour costs 
(Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013), and such work 
as therefore concentrated among those excluded from decent work and with little 
social protection who are pushed into this work in order to survive (Gallin, 2001; 
ILO, 2015; Taiwo, 2013).   
Until now, some limited evidence exists to support this marginalization thesis 
when studying the undeclared economy. Studies have shown that it is more prevalent 
in less affluent global regions (ILO, 2013), nations (Schneider and Williams, 2013; 
Williams, 2015), and localities (Kesteloot and Meert, 1999; Williams and Windebank, 
2001). Similarly, undeclared employment has been shown to be concentrated among 
those more likely to be excluded from the formal labour market, including the 
unemployed (Brill, 2011; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013; Williams and Nadin, 2014), 
ZRPHQ ,/2  /HRQDUG  6WăQFXOHVFX , and those with financial 
difficulties (Barbour and Llanes, 2013). However, other studies reveal undeclared 
employment to be more prevalent in affluent regions and localities (Evans et al., 
2006; van Geuns et al., 1987; Williams, 2004; Williams and Windebank, 2001), that 
the unemployed are not more likely to participate (Williams, 2001), that men are more 
likely to participate (Lemieux et al., 1994; McInnis-Dittrich, 1995) and those with 
financial difficulties less likely to participate than more affluent population groups 
(Williams, 2004), and that such an employment relationship is more common in 
smaller than larger firms (Perry et al, 2007).  
Indeed, a recent evaluation of this marginalization thesis in relation to 
undeclared work across the EU28 reveals that although valid when discussing 
younger people and those living in peripheral rural areas, it is not when considering 
those with fewer years in education, women, the unemployed and less affluent 
European regions (Williams and Horodnic 2015b). Meanwhile, and in relation to 
under-declared employment (i.e., where formal employees are paid an official 
GHFODUHGZDJHDQGDQDGGLWLRQDOXQGHFODUHGµHQYHORSH¶ZDJHVRWKDWHPSOR\HUVHYDGH
paying their full tax and social contributions), the finding has been that under-
declared employment is more likely among younger persons, men, unskilled manual 
workers, and those living in East-Central and Southern Europe (Williams and 
Horodnic, 2016a), suggesting again that some marginal populations are more likely to 
be engaged in the undeclared economy but not others. 
The only known study of the prevalence and distribution of work without 
contract similarly finds partial support for the marginalization thesis. Hazans (2011) 
uses European Social Survey data on 30 countries for the period between 2004 and 
2009, and finds that the proportion of employees without a contract is 2.7% in Nordic 
countries compared with 9.5% in Southern Europe, thus finding support for the 
marginalization thesis at the EU regional level. However, comparing Western and 
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East-Central Europe, there is little support since just over 5% of employees do not 
have a contract in both regions. However, support for the marginalization thesis is 
found when examining some demographic and socio-economic variations. Working 
without a contract is inversely related to education level, students more likely than 
other occupational groups, older and younger employees more likely, and women 
more likely than men to work without a contract. Based on these findings from the 
study of undeclared work in general, and the one study of work without contract, 
regarding the relevance of the marginalisation thesis when explaining its prevalence 
and distribution, we can therefore here test the following propositions: 
 
Socio-demographic marginality hypotheses 
H1a: Women are more likely to be employed without written terms of 
employment than men. 
H1b: Younger age groups are more likely to be employed without written 
terms of employment than older age groups. 
H1c: Workers with fewer years in formal education are more likely to be 
employed without written terms of employment than those who spent longer 
in formal education. 
 
Socio-economic marginality hypotheses 
H1d: Those with difficulties paying the bills are more likely to be employed 
without written terms of employment than those without difficulties paying 
the bills.  
H1e: Unskilled manual workers are more likely to be employed without 
written terms of employment than more skilled and professional workers. 
H1f: Those employed in small firms are more likely to be employed without 
written terms of employment than those employed in larger firms. 
 
Spatial marginality hypotheses 
H1g: Those employed in rural areas are more likely to be employed without 
written terms of employment than those in urban areas. 
H1h: Those living in East-Central Europe and Southern Europe are more 
likely to be employed without written terms of employment than those in 
Western Europe and Nordic countries.  
 
In recent years, nevertheless, the marginalization thesis which views participation in 
such an employment relationship as concentrated among populations marginalized 
from decent work and social protection has started to be challenged. Drawing 
inspiration from institutional theory (North, 1990), a more agency-oriented 
perspective has started to emerge when explaining undeclared employment (Williams 
and Horodnic, 2015a,b, 2016a,b). This could also be used to explain work without a 
written contract or terms of employment. On the one hand, work without a written 
contract or terms of employment can be viewed as arising from formal institutional 
failings to adhere to good practice, such as when governments fail to adhere to the 
1991 EU directive which calls for all employees to have a written contract or terms of 
employment.  
On the other hand, such work can be viewed as more prevalent when the 
intrinsic motivation to adhere to the formal labour laws regarding written contracts is 
low among employers. Here, therefore, importance is attached to whether employers 
accept the codified laws and regulations of the formal institutions, or whether they 
6 
 
choose to reject them and to offer work without written terms or conditions of 
employment. Viewed through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 
2008; North, 1990), all societies have formal institutions, which are codified laws and 
regulations that define the legal rules of the game, and informal institutions, which are 
WKH µVRFLDOO\ VKDUHG UXOHV XVXDOO\ XQZULWWHQ WKDW DUH FUHDWHG FRPPunicated and 
HQIRUFHGRXWVLGHRIRIILFLDOO\VDQFWLRQHGFKDQQHOV¶+HOPNHDQG/HYLWVN\
Labour law violations, such as not providing written contracts or terms of 
employment when national legislation requires this, thus arise when there is a gap 
EHWZHHQ WKH IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV ZKLFK ZH KHUH WHUP µVWDWH PRUDOH¶ DQG LQIRUPDO
LQVWLWXWLRQV KHUH WHUPHG µFLYLF PRUDOH¶ When this gap is large, the prevalence of 
employees without written contracts or terms of employment will be higher (Kistruck 
et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2009). The greater the degree of asymmetry between formal 
and informal institutions, the more prevalent will be employees without a written 
contract or terms of employment (cf. Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b, 2016a,b). 
Based on this alternative explanation regarding the prevalence of work without a 
written contract or terms of employment grounded in institutional theory, we 
therefore here test the following propositions: 
 
H2a: Those living in EU member states failing to adhere to the Employment 
Information Directive 1991 (91/553/EEC) are more likely to be employed 
without written terms of employment than those living in EU member states 
that adhere to this EU directive. 
H2b: The greater is the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, 
the greater is the likelihood of employment without written terms of 
employment.  
 
This suggests that public policy cannot tackle the prevalence of employees without a 
written contract or terms of employment unless it deals with the country-level formal 
institutional failings to implement this EU directive and/or the asymmetry between 
formal and informal institutions. Conventionally, however, this has not been the 
approach when tackling such a form of employment. Instead, a rational economic 
actor approach has been adopted (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). This views non-
compliance as occurring when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being 
caught and punished. Most governments have thus concentrated on the cost side of 
the equation by increasing the actual and/or perceived likelihood of detection for 
employers (e.g., Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Williams, 2014a). However, the evidence 
that this is effective is less than conclusive. Although some find that increasing the 
probability of detection reduces non-compliance (Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Varma 
and Doob, 1998), others reveal that non-compliance increases, not least due to a 
breakdown of trust between the state and employers (Chang and Lai, 2004; Kirchler 
et al., 2014; Williams and Horodnic, 2016c). Indeed, the perhaps most telling rebuttal 
of the rational actor model is that many employers voluntarily comply even when the 
benefit/cost ratio suggests that they should not (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; 
Murphy 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007). As such, this policy approach towards 
tackling this practice, based on a rational economic actor approach, can be tested 
using the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: Increasing the risk of detection reduces the prevalence of employees 
without written terms of employment. 
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Data and Methodology 
 
Data 
To test these hypotheses regarding the prevalence and distribution of employment 
without written contracts or terms of employment, we here report the results of 
special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, which involved 27,563 face-to-face interviews 
conducted in April and May 2013 across the EU-28, of which 11,025 interviews were 
with employees and examined whether they had a written contract of employment. 
The sampling frame was adults aged 15 years and older and the interviews were 
conducted in the national language based on a multi-stage random (probability) 
sampling methodology, with the number of interviews varying from 500 in smaller 
countries to 1,500 in larger nations. This methodology ensures that on the issues of 
gender, age, region and locality size, each country as well as each level of sample is 
representative in proportion to its population size. Therefore, for the univariate 
analysis we used sample weighting, as recommended in both the wider literature 
(Solon et al. 2013; Winship and Radbill 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology, 
to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis however, debate 
exists over whether a weighting scheme should be used (Pfefferman 1994; Solon et al. 
2013; Winship and Radbill 1994). Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, we decided not 
to use the weighting scheme. The face-to-face interviews covered attitudes towards 
undeclared work, followed by questions on their purchase of undeclared goods and 
services, envelope wages and finally whether they worked undeclared and without a 
written contract of employment.  
 
Variables  
To analyze the above hypotheses, the dependent variable is a dummy variable which 
is equal to 1 if the employees respond yes to the question: µDoes the following apply 
to you? You are employed without a formal written contract¶, and is 0 otherwise.  
 To analyze the prevalence and distribution of employment without a formal 
written contract, the following individual-level variables, used in previous studies of 
the undeclared economy (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b, 20`16a,b), are analyzed to 
test the marginalization thesis hypotheses about the socio-demographic, socio-
economic and spatial distribution of work without a written contract or terms of 
employment: 
x Gender: a dummy variable with value one for women and zero for men. 
x Age: a categorical variable with value one for individuals between 15 and 24, 
value two for 25-39, value three for 40-54 and value four for those aged 55 and 
above. 
x Age formal education ended: a categorical variable for age they stopped full time 
education with value one for those without full-time education, value two for the 
15 years old and under, value three for 16-19 years old, and value four for the 20 
years old or over. 
x Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the difficulties in paying bills 
with value one for having difficulties almost never/never, value two for 
occasionally, and value three for most of the time. 
x Occupation: a categorical variable grouping employed respondents by their 
occupation with value one for those employed professionals, value two for those 
employed in general, middle management and supervisors, value three for those in 
an employed position at a desk, value four for those in an employed position, 
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travelling, value five for those in an employed position in a service job, value six 
for skilled manual workers and value seven for unskilled manual workers. 
x Firm size D FDWHJRULFDO YDULDEOH IRU WKH QXPEHU RI SHRSOH WKDW UHVSRQGHQW¶V
employer employs with value one for firms with one to four people, value two for 
firms with five to nine people, value three for firms with ten to 19 people, value 
four for firms with 20 to 49 people, value five for firms with 50 to 99 people, 
value six for firms with 100 to 499 people and value seven for firms with 500 or 
more than 500 people. 
x Type of community: A categorical variable about the size of the residence. There 
are three size groups; with value one for the rural area, value two for the middle 
sized area and value three for the large residency area. 
x EU Regional Dummies: EU-28 member states are classified under four EU 
Regions. Namely; Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom), Eastern and 
Central Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia), Southern Europe (Cyprus, 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal) and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden). 
To evaluate the institutionalist and rational economic actor explanations and policy 
approaches, meanwhile, the respective indicators analysed are: 
x  perceived risk of detection, a categorical variable measuring the risk of being 
detected with recoded value one for very small, value two for fairly small, value 
three for fairly high and value four for very high; 
x  attitudes towards non-compliance, measured using an interval variable based on 
HPSOR\HHV¶ UDWLQJ WKH DFFHSWDELOLW\ RI VL[ IRUPV RI QRQ-compliance using a 10-
point Likert scale (1 equals absolutely unacceptable and 10 equals absolutely 
acceptable). These are: someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; a 
firm is hired by another firm and does not report earnings; a firm hires a private 
person and all or part of their salary is not declared; a firm is hired by a household 
and does not report earnings; someone evades taxes by not or only partially 
declaring income; and a person hired by a household does not declare earnings 
when it should be declared. The index for each individual is calculated using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method, which provided a composite non-
compliance index between -1.68 and 9.30. Overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
of sampling adequacy is around 90%, which shows that the composite index 
explains a high level of variation in the data. Lower values represent higher tax 
morale, and vice versa. 
 
Analytical methods 
To evaluate the prevalence of employees without a written contract or terms of 
employment across population groups, we conduct a staged logistic regression 
analysis across the individual-level variables. We first analyse the role of socio-
demographic factors in explaining employment without a contract and, then, 
incorporate various socio-economic factors into the model. In the third stage, 
variables related to the formal institutional environment are added to the regression 
model. Finally, spatial factors are examined in the full model. As there are potential 
endogeneity issues due to the reverse causality between our dependent variable and 
various explanatory factors included in the regression models, such as the tax-morale 
index, one should be cautious that the findings of the econometric analysis suggests 
not causality but rather association.  
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Findings 
 
Of the 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted during 2013 across the EU-28, some 
11,025 respondents (42 per cent) were employees. Of these, one in 20 (5 per cent) 
reported that they did not have a written contract of employment. Extrapolating, this 
suggests that 10.6 million of the 212 million employees in the EU-28 do not have a 
written contract or terms of employment despite the existence of the 1991 EU 
directive calling for such an arrangement. 
 Employees without a written contract or terms of employment, however, are 
not evenly distributed across EU regions and member states. As Table 1 displays, 
14.2% of all employees in Southern Europe report not having a written contract or 
terms of employment, but only 4.7% in Western Europe, 3.4% in the Nordic countries 
and 2.4% in East-Central Europe. Indeed, some 42% of all employees without such a 
contract are in Southern Europe. This lack of a written contract, moreover, is 
especially concentrated in Cyprus, Portugal and Malta where 29.9%, 27.6% and 
21.8% of all employees do not have a written contract or terms of employment, thus 
partially confirming H2a that those living in EU member states failing to fully adhere 
to the 1991 Employment Information Directive are more likely to be employed 
without written terms of employment than those living in EU member states that 
adhere to this EU directive. There are also countries in other EU regions, which have 
a higher percentage share of employees without a written contract than the EU-
average, including Ireland (13.4%) and the UK (6.8%) in Western Europe, as well as 
Lithuania (5.1%) in East-Central Europe. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Variations also exist across businesses types as well as demographic and socio-
economic groups in the prevalence of work without a written contract. As Table 2 
reveals, the larger is the firm size, the smaller is the proportion employed without a 
contract; 12.3% of employees in firms with a size of 1-4 employees are employed 
without a written contract, but only 2.1% in firms with more than 499 employees. The 
outcome is that 22.5% of all employees without a formal contract work in firms with 
less than 5 employees, despite only 9.1% of all employees being in such micro-
businesses. This in part may be a result of the relative absence of dedicated HRM 
staff and formal HRM practices in smaller businesses (Barrett and Mayson 2007; 
Benmore and Palmer 1996), meaning that employers can more easily employ 
employees without a written contract or terms of employment.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
These descriptive findings also reveal that manual workers are more likely not to be 
given written contracts or terms of employment compared with employees in other 
occupations; 9.5% of unskilled manual workers do not have a formal contract 
compared with 6.2% of skilled manual workers. Indeed, 40.5% of those without a 
written contract are in manual jobs. In terms of gender and age, there is not a 
distinctive relationship. Men are slightly more likely to have a job without a written 
contract. Younger people are also more likely than other age groups, except for those 
above 65 years old, intimating a U-shaped relationship. It is similarly the case that 
those with fewer years in education are slightly more likely to have no written terms 
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of employment. Those whose formal education ended before 15 years old are 7.2% of 
all employees but 16.3% of those without a formal written contract, whilst those 
whose education ended aged 20 or older are 42% of the workforce but just 29.9% of 
those without a written contract.   
Turning to the socio-economic and institutional factors, the finding is that 
there is an association between the difficulties faced in paying bills and the likelihood 
of working without a written contract; 8.1% of employees having difficulty most of 
the time in paying bills do not have a written contract. Similarly, those without a 
written contract also have lower tax morale. We also observe that employees without 
a written contract are more prevalent in small/middle towns compared with rural areas 
and large towns. Thus, the tentative picture that emerges is that the prevalence of 
employees without a written contract is more related to socio-economic and 
institutional environment characteristics than it is to socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
Although these descriptive statistics are informative about the prevalence of 
employees without a written contract, there is a need to control for and take into 
account other variables when analyzing the association. Table 3 therefore presents the 
empirical results of five different regression models. Model 1 only includes socio-
demographic variables. This reveals that socio-demographic factors (i.e., gender, age 
and educational level) do not have a statistically significant association with the 
probability of being employed without a written contract (refuting H1a, H1b and 
H1c). Model 2 incorporates socio-economic factors into the regression model. This 
shows that although having difficulties paying the bills is not significantly associated 
with not having a written contract (refuting H1d), and neither is occupational status 
(refuting H1e), firm size is significantly associated with the likelihood of being 
employed without a written contract when other socio-demographic and socio-
economic factors are taken into account (confirming H1f). The larger the firm, the 
lower is the probability of being employed without a written contract. For example, 
the probability of working without a written contract is 7 percentage points less for 
employees working in firms with more than 499 employees compared with employees 
in firms with less than 5 employees. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In addition to the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors, Model 3 adds 
variables related to the formal institutional environment. This reveals that the greater 
the asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions (i.e., the lower the level 
of tax morale), the higher the chance of being employed without a written contract 
(confirming H2b). However, it must be noted that firm size has a greater influence on 
the prevalence of employment without a written contract than tax morale. 
Interestingly, nevertheless, a greater perceived risk of detection has no significant 
association with the prevalence of employees without written terms of employment 
(refuting H3).  
Finally, the importance of the spatial factors is analyzed in Model 4 and 
Model 5. It can be seen that the probability of being employed without a formal 
written contract is higher in larger towns compared with smaller/middle sized towns 
and rural areas (refuting H1h). Employees in large towns have 2% higher probability 
of being without a written contract compared with those inhabiting rural areas. In 
addition to locality size, Model 5 also shows the association between EU region and 
the prevalence of employees without a written contract, when other factors are taken 
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into account. Confirming the descriptive statistics, this reveals that employees in 
Southern Europe have a 4.2% greater probability of being employed without a written 
contract compared with those in Western Europe (partially confirming H1h). 
Interestingly, employees in East-Central Europe have 3.3% lower probability of 
working without a written contract compared with West European employees. 
Although they are not reported in Table 3, the marginal effects for the country dummy 
variables in the full model (Model 4) reveal that employees in Cyprus have the 
highest probability of being employed without a formal contract when other factors 
are taken into account. The second highest probability of employment without a 
written contract is observed in Malta followed by Portugal and Ireland, thus 
confirming H2a. 
Overall, therefore, firm size, institutional environment and spatial factors are 
important in explaining the prevalence of employment without a formal contract. 
Governments should thus address not directly individuals but firms and general 
institutional environment in order to reduce the level of employment without a formal 
written contract practice, and focus their attention on larger towns and Southern 
European countries, especially Cyprus, Malta and Portugal. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
To evaluate whether employees from marginalized populations are more likely to be 
without written terms of employment, this paper has revealed that it is less socio-
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and more firm size, institutional 
environment and spatial factors that are important in explaining the prevalence of 
employees without a written contract or terms of employment. Thus, governments 
should address not individuals but rather, the formal institutional failings and 
asymmetry between civic morality and state morality, in order to reduce the level of 
employment without a written contract, and focus their attention on smaller firms, 
larger towns and Southern European countries, especially Cyprus, Malta and Portugal.  
 Examining the theoretical implications, the outcome is that there is a need to 
transcend the marginalization thesis when explaining employment without written 
terms of employment. The prevalence of such work is not associated with groups 
relatively excluded from decent work and social protection across the EU28. Indeed, 
few marginalized population groups are significantly more likely to have no written 
terms of employment. Rather, there is a need for more attention to be paid to the 
formal institutional failings to fully implement the EU directive across all types of 
employee, and the asymmetry between state morality and civic morality, which result 
in a greater likelihood of employment without written contracts or terms of 
employment. For example, in Cyprus, the country with the highest level of employees 
without a written contract or terms of employment, a written contract is not required 
for atypical workers (e.g., apprenticeships, fixed-term, seasonal and part-time 
workers) and employers are allowed to wait up to one month after employing 
somebody to provide them with a written contract. In Portugal, meanwhile, a written 
FRQWUDFW LVUHTXLUHGRQO\IRU³DW\SLFDO´HPSOR\PHQW, such as fixed-term contracts of 
employment, contracts of unspecified duration, intermittent, teleworking and part-
time contracts (fixed or indefinite); otherwise an oral contract is acceptable. Unless 
this lack of requirement by employers to issue written terms of employment to all 
workers is reviewed, employers will not voluntarily provide written terms of 
employment, exemplified by the current high level of employees without a written 
contract or terms of employment in countries where it is not necessary.  
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There are, however, limitations to this study and what is known. Currently 
unknown is the proportion of employees without written contracts that result from 
employers not being legally required to provide some groups with written terms of 
employment, and the proportion of employees without written contracts that result 
from employers flouting national labour legislation and failing to issue written terms 
of employment. Neither is there currently any evidence-base about how the conditions 
of employment of workers without written contracts differ to their equivalents who 
have written contracts or terms of employment. Until this is evaluated, the evidence-
base on the implications of workers not being issued with written contracts or terms 
of employment will remain unknown. Moreover, it should be noted that this paper 
evaluates only whether those self-reporting that they are employees have a written 
contract or terms of employment. It does not investigate whether others who do not 
report themselves as employees may be dependent employees without a written 
contract, such as those who self-report themselves as students, the retired and 
unemployed. This is a potential limitation of the research.  
 In sum, this paper has revealed for the first time the prevalence and 
distribution of employees without written contracts or terms of employment in the 
European Union. What is now required is further investigation of their conditions of 
employment compared with those who have written contracts or terms of employment 
such as in terms of wage rates, health and safety conditions, and holiday entitlements. 
If this paper stimulates such research, then it will have fulfilled one of its intentions. If 
it is found that working conditions are poorer, and thus action is taken to ensure 
written contracts or terms of employment across all employee groups in the EU28 and 
beyond, then this paper will have fulfilled its wider intention. 
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Table 1. Cross-national variations in the prevalence of employment without a written 
contract, by EU member state 
 
 
  
Region/ country Number of employees 
surveyed 
% of employees 
without a written 
contract 
% of all employees 
without a written 
contract 
EU-28 11,025 5 100 
East-Central Europe 4,670 2.4 20.5 
Latvia 509 3.3 3.1 
Croatia 328 2.1 1.3 
Romania 391 3.1 2.2 
Slovakia 497 0 0 
Bulgaria 442 0.9 0.7 
Hungary 442 4.5 3.6 
Lithuania 414 5.1 3.8 
Czech Republic 502 1.2 1.1 
Estonia 434 2.1 1.6 
Poland 381 3.7 2.5 
Slovenia 330 0.9 0.5 
Southern Europe 1,626 14.2 42.0 
Greece 260 8.8 4.2 
Spain 279 4.3 2.2 
Portugal 312 27.6 15.6 
Cyprus 211 29.9 11.4 
Italy 417 3.6 2.7 
Malta 147 21.8 5.8 
Western Europe 3,548 4.7 30.2 
Belgium 406 4.9 3.6 
Luxembourg 247 1.2 0.5 
Netherlands 384 1.8 1.3 
Austria 520 3.8 3.6 
Ireland 394 13.4 9.6 
United Kingdom 497 6.8 6.2 
France 429 4 3.1 
Germany 671 1.8 2.2 
Nordic nations 1,181 3.4 7.3 
Denmark 423 4.0 3.1 
Finland 342 4.4 2.7 
Sweden 416 1.9 1.4 
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Table 2. Prevalence of employment without a written contract in the EU-28, by type 
of business and employee group 
 % of employees 
without a 
written contract 
in prior year 
among all 
employees 
% of all 
employees who 
do not have a 
written contract 
% of all 
employees 
All EU28 5 100 100 
Firm size:    
1 - 4 employees 12.3 22.5 9.1 
5 ± 9 7.8 16.8 10.8 
10 ± 19 6.1 16.8 13.9 
20 ± 49 4.2 14.1 16.9 
50 ± 99 4.2 10.8 12.8 
100 ± 499 3.2 10.6 16.5 
500 or more 2.1 8.4 19.9 
Occupation:    
Professional (doctor, lawyer, accountant, 
architect) 4.1 5.3 7.2 
Top, middle management, supervisor 3.3 12.7 19.2 
Employed mainly at desk 3.8 14.9 19.4 
Employed travelling (salesperson, driver) 5.3 8 7.5 
Service job not at desk (hospital, restaurant, 
police, etc.) 5.0 18 17.8 
Skilled manual worker 6.2 26.5 21.5 
Unskilled manual worker 9.5 14 7.4 
Gender:    
Man 5.2 50 47.6 
Woman 4.8 50 52.4 
Age:    
15-24 6.7 8.4 6.2 
25-34 5.6 25.8 22.8 
35-44 5.2 28.9 27.5 
45-54 4.2 23.3 27.3 
55-64 4.0 11.8 14.6 
65+ 6 1.8 1.5 
Age formal education ended:   
No full-time education 
<15 
0 
11.2 
0 
16.3 
0.2 
7.2 
16-19 5.3 53.8 50.5 
20+ 3.5 29.9 42.0 
Difficulties paying bills:    
Most of the time 8.1 18.0 11.1 
From time to time 5.9 37.9 31.5 
Almost never/never 3.8 44.0 57.5 
Detection risk:    
Very small 6.5 22.9 17.3 
Fairly small 3.9 35.2 44.8 
Fairly high 5.2 32.2 30.6 
Very high 6.5 9.7 7.3 
Tax morality index:    
Below mean 5.2 57.4 62.4 
  Above mean 
Type of community: 
Rural Area 
Small/middle town 
Large town 
4.8 
 
5 
4.4 
5.7 
42.5 
 
32.1 
38.3 
29.6 
37.6 
 
32.1 
33.8 
34.1 
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Table 3. Marginal Effects of the Individual-level predictors for the probability of employment without 
a written contract 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
Socio-demographic factors: 
  Gender (1=Female, 0= Male) 
 
-.001 
 
-.001 
 
-.001 
 
-.000 
 
-.001 
  Age Categories 
  (Reference Category: between 15 and 24) 
- between 25 and 39 
- between 40 and 54 
- above 55 
 
 
-.006  
-.015 
-.020* 
 
 
-.001 
-.006 
-.011 
 
 
.000 
-.004 
-.009 
 
 
.001 
-.004 
-.009 
 
 
.004 
-.004 
-.005 
   Education Level 
   (Reference Category: No full-time education) 
- before 15 
- 16-19 
- above 20 
 
 
.543 
.528 
.499 
 
 
.516 
.508 
.490 
 
 
.511 
.504 
.486 
 
 
.511 
.503 
.485 
 
 
.575 
.568 
.550 
Socio-economic factors: 
  Difficulties paying bills 
   (Reference Category: Almost never/never) 
- From time to time 
- Most of the time 
   Current Occupation 
   (Reference Category: Employed Professional) 
- General, middle managers and supervisors 
- Employed position, at desk 
- Employed position, travelling 
- Employed position, service job 
- Skilled manual worker 
- Unskilled manual worker 
   Firm Size (Reference Category: 1-4 employees) 
- 5-9  
- 10-19  
- 20-49  
- 50-99  
- 100-499 
- 500 and more 
Formal Institutional Environment: 
  Perception of Detection Risk 
  Tax Morality Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.002 
-.003 
 
 
-.013 
-.005 
-.002 
.003 
.005 
.016 
 
-.016** 
-.020*** 
-.033*** 
-.034*** 
-.047*** 
-.068*** 
 
 
 
.000 
-.003 
 
 
-.013 
-.004 
-.002 
.003 
.005 
.017 
 
-.016** 
-.020*** 
-.032*** 
-.033*** 
-.046*** 
-.067*** 
 
-.002 
.003*** 
 
 
 
.000 
-.003 
 
 
-.012 
-.004 
-.001 
.005 
.007 
.018 
 
-.015** 
-.020*** 
-.032*** 
-.033*** 
-.046*** 
-.067*** 
 
-.001 
.004*** 
 
 
 
.005 
.005 
 
 
-.018 
-.017 
-.009 
-.002 
.002 
.011 
 
-.018** 
-.023*** 
-.036*** 
-.034*** 
-.048*** 
-.071*** 
 
-.001 
.003*** 
Spatial factors: 
   Size of Residence 
   (Reference Category:  Rural Area) 
- Middle-sized urban 
- Large urban 
   EU Region Dummies 
  (Reference Category: Western Europe) 
- Eastern and Central Europe 
- Southern Europe 
- Nordic Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
.016*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.004 
.014** 
 
 
-.033*** 
.042*** 
.004 
Country FE 
Pseudo-R2 
YES 
0.1405 
YES 
0.1663 
YES 
0.1689 
YES 
0.1718 
NO 
0.1041 
Number of Observations 8,535 8,535 8,535 8,535 8,535 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
NOTES: Missing observations are dropped from the dataset to equalize the sample size across different models in order to make 
the results comparable. The percentage of the employed without a formal written contract is 4.93% after excluding the missing 
values. The share of it is 4.99% in the raw data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
